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Abstract 
The global demand for product quality and safety in Western European markets has motivated rapid growth of 
production and marketing codes of conduct between business partners. However, though the Kenya Horticultural 
Crops Development Authority’s code of conduct on contractual guidelines has promoted business to farm 
business (B2B) relationships between exporters and smallholders, the relationships have received little empirical 
analysis. This paper uses case analysis based on strategic marketing framework to examine the B2B’s purpose, 
target and competitive, growth, promotion, distribution, and pricing strategies. The analysis reveals that the B2B 
strategies are based on supply chain governance constructs: written and verbal contracts. The purpose of the 
contracts is to manage procurement of high quality and safe produce which in itself is contingent on the 
European Union market served. On targets, written contracts seem efficient with organized producers and verbal 
contracts with independent producers. As competitive edges, written contracts are orientated toward 
differentiation strategy and verbal contracts, low-cost strategy. Growth in written contracts is through market 
penetration and diversification in verbal contracts. However, sharp differences exist on distributional, 
promotional and pricing strategies. 
Keywords: code of conduct, contracts, marketing strategies, horticulture, Kenya  
 
1. Introduction  
Since the beginning of the 1990s issues of agricultural sustainability, food safety and quality have dominated 
global trade in fruits and vegetables. This has been motivated partly by food scares that locked the European 
market (e.g. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Dioxin etc), and the legislations on food safety in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and France which passed more food safety responsibility to the private sector players 
(European Commission, 2000). As a result supermarkets established their own codes of conduct, implemented 
traceability and quality meta-systems (e.g. Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP)) to reassure 
consumers of the quality and safety of products sourced and distributed through their chains (Henson and 
Caswell, 1999). The established standards factored on upstream suppliers (i.e. growers, input suppliers etc) 
through business to business certification schemes (e.g. EurepGAP
1
) focussing more attention on product quality 
and safety issues by way of applying good agricultural practices, observing employment and corporate social 
responsibility values (Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). Consequently, code of conducts became an avenue to 
embrace agricultural sustainability concept (World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 
1987). Notable for instance is that firms in the industrial and manufacturing sectors are actively involved in 
codes of conduct (World Bank (2002). 
 
Codes of conduct varies from the protection of the environment, economic issues like employment and fair 
prices, to socio-cultural factors like gender and sanitation (WCED, 1987). Internationally, there are independent 
social codes (e.g. Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI)), company codes (International Standards Organization (ISO) 
9000) or sectoral codes (e.g. EurepGAP) (Barrientos and Dolan, 2003). Within the framework of these codes of 
conduct are national ones designed to reflect the social and economic environment of respective trade 
participants in their own countries. For example, Kenya Flower Council (KFC) has developed a code for cut 
flower producers and exporters and Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya (FPEAK) has one for fruit 
and vegetables participants.  
 
Industry wide, Kenya’s Horticultural Crops Development Authority (HCDA) developed a code of conduct 
covering among others good business practices between exporters and suppliers, guidelines for good agricultural 
practices (e.g. use, application and control of pesticides), and traceability (HCDA, 1995). Under HCDA’s code 
the number of exporters has grown, the volumes and value of exports increased and international market changes 
have been adopted at the production and marketing level. For instance, studies by Dolan et al., (1999) and Japan 
                                                           
1
 Since 7th September 2007 EurepGAP is now GlobalGAP which reflects its expanding international role in establishing Good 
Agricultural Practices. 
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Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) (2003) indicated between 151 and 200 licensed fresh produce 
exporters with 50 annual operators and 150 sporadically entering and exiting the industry during the October-
April peak season. However, the fresh produce export business is highly concentrated and subsequently supplies 
from smallholders shrinking. For example, by the end of the 1990s, over 75% of all Kenyan fresh produce 
exports were being supplied to EU supermarkets by seven top firms and  procurement from smallholders had 
decreased from a high of 18% in 1998 to a low of 11% in 2001 (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). In terms of 
national contribution, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) (2009) shows that horticulture exports of cut flowers, 
fruits and vegetables contributed 23% of the total export earnings a sizeable 13% of the agricultural gross 
domestic product. 
 
Barrientos and Dolan (2003) opine that codes of conduct though based on production and quality management 
systems aim at enhancing the marketing potential of horticultural exports in the European Union (EU). Therefore, 
this paper explores how the HCDA-Code of Conduct on contractual guidelines (hereafter referred to as CoC) is 
implemented between exporters and smallholders’ farm businesses in French beans marketing. Recognizing that 
export marketing requires a contractual farming arrangement; exporters provide the immediate markets and 
smallholders, farm business suppliers and consequently, a business to business (B2B) exchange is 
conceptualized. Contracts are either written or verbal depending on the EU market served, size, and objective of 
exporters and smallholders. Using the CoC, clues for the purpose, targeted suppliers and derived competitive, 
growth, promotion, distribution and pricing strategies for each contractual regime are highlighted. The purpose 
of contracting, competitive and growth strategies may be founded on the global demand for quality and safe 
agricultural products in developed countries. The major motivators are the need for consistent, reliable and 
consumer-driven products and the changing regulatory and marketing environments in established and emerging 
markets (Jaffee, 2003). Therefore contracting smallholders may be a priori to ease access to quality and safe 
supplies to meet demand in Western European markets. On competitive strategies, an exporter seeks to position 
own business in the ever changing marketing environment dictated by consumers’ tastes and preferences (Burton 
et al., 2001). Due to evolving regulations on trade and commerce, an exporter might grow by venturing into new 
market niches or deepen their product offers to existing consumers. Promotion strategies emanate from the 
representation of an exporter and the relationship with smallholders in relation to product exchange at the farm 
level. Procurement of French beans requires elaborate arrangements to ensure reliability of supplies throughout 
the season and to avoid produce diversion to part time exporters who seek to fill-in orders (Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000). Since supplies come from numerous smallholders, product identification and the need to share 
information on prices, markets, new methods of farming, and food safety and quality standards is critical to 
check on product quality and safety violations. Therefore, distribution strategies arise because French beans are 
perishable in nature, require early harvesting and subsequently quick transport of post-harvest to export exit 
points in Nairobi which is 120kms away from the study region, Mwea Tebere. Additionally, scattered small 
farms over a wide growing area and small outputs from individual smallholders make produce assembly 
essential (Neven and Reardon, 2004). Finally, pricing defines the expected profitability of engaging in the 
contractual farming arrangement subject to output restrictions (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). The price offered 
communicates the value placed on farm produce and the competitiveness of an exporter. Economically, it may 
reflect the extent of buyer or seller power in marketing. Nevertheless, the farm level price may be tempered by 
locality differences (e.g. good roads), an exporter’s target market in the EU and the promotion strategies utilized. 
 
2. The conditioning regulatory environment and HCDA’s code of conduct   
The HCDA code of conduct is established under the Export Order of 1995 (HCDA, 1995). The code was 
designed at a time when the EU, the principle market for Kenyan horticulture was experiencing regulatory and 
market changes. For instance,, the EU directive on pesticide residues, food hygiene and harmonized framework 
on pesticides and the UK Food Safety Act became pertinent issues in the production, handling and distribution of 
all exports destined for the EU in the early 1990s (Jaffee and Masakure, 2005). The latter years of 1990 were 
marked by EU wide monitoring program on Maximum Pesticide Residual Levels (EU-MRL) and the formation 
of private food quality schemes (e.g. British Retailers Consortium Standard, EurepGAP, Ethical Trading 
Initiative etc), which would later become key quality and safety standards in the Kenyan market (ibid). Later, the 
gradual dominance of supermarkets in the EU and decline of wholesale markets as key importers of horticultural 
exports from Kenya and development of supermarkets’ product labels increased (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). 
Additionally, competition on prices started dwindling in favour of competition based on quality (Jaffee, 2003). 
 
The Export Order of 1995 defines the CoC is an agreement between the "buyer" of fresh horticultural produce 
and the "seller" or grower of the produce. Buyers are either exporters and/or processors of fresh horticultural 
produce and sellers, either individual growers, or schemes which have been developed to benefit groups of small 
landholders in the horticultural production business. The main aims and objectives of the CoC include 1) to act 
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as a memorandum of understanding between the buyer and the seller of fresh horticultural produce, 2) to serve as 
a guideline for the buyer and the seller in order to conduct good business practices which will be mutually 
beneficial and help promote the well being of the horticultural industry in Kenya, and 3) to act as a guideline or 
framework for development of a legally binding contract to be executed by the buyer and the seller. We premise 
that a contract (3
rd
 object) is more pertinent in consolidating buyer-seller’s level of understanding (2
nd
 object) 
and good business practices, mutual benefit and success of the horticultural industry in Kenya (3
rd
 object). By 
emphasizing on use of contracts when procuring horticultural produce from smallholdings, the CoC seeks to 
draw from the benefits of: a) reduced transaction costs of not renegotiating contracts with specific exporters 
every end of season, b) access to stable and reliable supplies, and c) favourable environment for information 
sharing on prices, market demand and new methods of farming. Since the fruits and vegetables’ value chain 
focuses on quality, hygiene and safety, contracts ensure institutionalization of on-farm training and monitoring 
frameworks on such matters. This is plausible because smallholders’ basic knowledge on and interpretation of 
codified information on product quality, hygiene and safety is limited and uncertain. Contracts also mitigate the 
hold-up problem associated with specific assets like packing houses and cooling plants for exporters, and 
grading sheds for organized groups. 
 
2.1 Salient elements of the CoC  
Initially, farmers should be organized into well managed groups through registration with the relevant 
government Ministry. Organized producers benefit exporters with economies of scale in terms of total farm size 
which is critical in implementing integrated crop and pest management, quality management systems, 
certification and traceability (Okello and Swinton, 2007). There is also ease in the provision of reasonable 
extension services at reduced costs per farmer which minimizes monitoring and administrative costs. 
Additionally, organized producers have the potential for efficient market access through reduced costs of crop 
assembly, information sharing and product grading (Narrod et al., 2009). 
 
Secondly, smallholders need to be trained on safe and effective use of pesticides to acquire requisite competence 
to farm high quality, hygienic and safe produce. This is based on the official EU standards relating to fixing of 
maximum levels for pesticide residues in and on fruit and vegetables (Commission of European Communities, 
2000). Training smallholders on reduction of use of banned or restricted and increased use of classified 
pesticides and observation of pre-harvest spraying intervals is critical in minimizing pesticide residues in farm 
produce. Additionally, training on personal hygiene and safe disposal of pesticides materials reduces possible 
microbiological contamination of post-harvest produce and environmental conservation of soils and water ways. 
Crop and environmental protection, and personal hygiene are mandatory critical control points in the 
certification process to KenyaGAP/GlobalGAP standard (Graffham et al., 2007). 
 
Thirdly, smallholders should have proper record keeping which is founded on the need for traceability contained 
in European Communities regulation 178/2002 (Commission of European Communities, 2002). Traceability is 
an indispensable part of any market for process credence attributes or content attributes that are difficult or costly 
to measure (Golan et al., 2004). Essentially, producers are required to ensure that all farming activities directed 
toward the production of the marketed produce from land preparation to post harvest are documented. This 
includes among others type of pesticides, time of use, number of times sprayed, time crop was planted, type of 
seeds used, source of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. Traceability improves supply management, and facilitates 
trace-back for purposes of food safety and quality by minimizing the production and distribution of unsafe or 
poor quality products and consequently minimizing the potential for bad publicity, liability and recalls (Golan et 
al., 2004). For instance, there may be self-testing or official testing for pesticide residues in government 
laboratories to identify and ascertain produce’s compliance with set residue levels. 
 
3. The analytical approach    
In the analytical process, we focus on the CoC as the basis for co-opting smallholders in strategic business 
partnerships with exporters through establishment of farm-level B2B supply management. The purpose is to map 
the possible contribution in the success of the Kenyan horticulture industry. The paper uses a case analysis 
approach as explained in Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2004) to ask how the salient features of the CoC are 
manifested at the farm level. Further, as in Ingenbleek and Meulenberg (2006) strategic marketing concepts are 
used to carry out a case examination of exporters’ strategies when procuring supplies from smallholders with 
respect to the purpose of relational contracting, target market, competitive, growth, promotion, distribution and 
pricing strategies. 
 
3.1 Focus of Analysis   
The CoC specifies requirements that should be met by the buyer, the seller and jointly. Following the CoC’s 
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preamble, exporters and outgrower groups should engage in the execution of a contract before conducting 
business (HCDA, 1995). We focus on a contract as the basis of exporter-farmer B2B supply management 
framework. Here, we relax the preamble to accommodate market dynamics by suggesting that farm level B2B 
relations between exporters and smallholders might be conducted with outgrower groups or independent 
producers under a written or verbal contract. A written contract is identified through a signed document. Because 
of export market complexities (e.g. market knowledge, coded product quality information etc) exporters are 
assumed to choose the governance structure and the smallholders to engage. Further, the CoC stipulates that a 
contract must include specific terms and conditions of payment, responsibilities for production, handling and 
collection of produce, and any other essential elements which will create a clear understanding of the obligations 
of both the buyer and the seller (see table 1). This study considers the specific terms and conditions as 
foundation for exporters’ strategies. For instance a contract’s condition of payment is viewed as a pricing 
strategy and handling and collection of produce a distribution strategy. Consequently, the features used in 
exporters-smallholders B2B relations might help to deduce exporters’ purpose, target market, competitive, 
growth, promotion, distribution and pricing strategies. 
 
Using the abridged contract guidelines in table 1, we define the purpose, target market, competitive, growth, 
promotion, distribution and pricing strategies. The table shows that there is emphasis on quality and quantity, 
record keeping, support and training, good agricultural practices, produce rejection, contract duration and 
payment mechanism etc.  
 
Table 1: Selected HCDA Code of Conduct’s Contract Guidelines 
Contract feature Description of requirements 
Quality and quantity Package weight, prices, minimum collectable quantity, quality levels based on 
Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS), National Research Institute (NRI) manual and 
specific importers etc 
Inputs Supply of certified seeds, fertilizers/pesticides, conditions for purchase/sale of inputs 
Generally accepted 
production principles 
Use /application of approved pesticides and recommended fertilizers per 
manufacturers’ label, random produce testing for pesticides 
Record keeping Seed/herbicide/pesticides (used, treatments, date, rates) weather (irrigation dates, 
quantities): harvesting (dates) 
Support and training Group administration, production, handling, grading, collaboration with Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) 
Harvesting Use of clean containers, protection of produce from heat and direct sunlight, 
maintenance of hygienic conditions 
Grading Inspection and grading of produce, when, where documentation of 
collection/delivery, when title of goods change 
Packaging Supply of packaging materials, acceptable conditions of the package on collection, 
condition and quantity of produce, grade and type of produce, placement and 
orientation within a container 
Collection Time and year, conditions for non-collection, purchase of produce within specified 
time, 24hrs produce retention after specified time at buyer’s expense, tolerance of +/-
10% due to shortages and excesses. 
Middlemen No transactions with middlemen/intermediaries involving produce on contract 
Multiple contracts No multiple contracts with same seller, multiple contracts allowed if there are no 
unscrupulous business practices 
Rejected produce Point of rejection, conditions for the return of rejected produce, means of disposal, 
accepted deliveries not returnable 
Payment mechanism Acceptable payment terms, mechanism of safe and timely transfer of funds 
Penalties Compensation for failure to abide with the laid down regulations of the contract 
Contract duration Duration and maturity of contract 
Contract termination Written notice, reasonable period-full production or marketing cycle of produce 
NB: A complete version of the HCDA-CoC is available at www.hcda.or.ke.  
Source: Horticultural Crops Development Authority, 2014 
 
On contracts, producers may not use middlemen and buyers have to give a written notice on the intent to 
terminate a contract. This suggests preference for direct linkage to markets and use of enforceable written 
contracts. The stipulated features in the CoC are used in addition to the features that are essential in creating 
clear understanding of the obligations of participants. The latter include seller obligations like the ability to use, 
apply and control pesticides, competence in record keeping and organized production. Further, buyer obligations 
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might include provision of extension services, packaging materials, inspection and grading, and quality of 
produce. Jointly, sellers and buyers have the obligation to implement a trace-back system. We recognize that, 
these being guidelines only, exporters might have variations in the stipulated and essential features at the farm 
level. For example, one exporter might engage independent producers, another producer groups and another both. 
Therefore, the focus is on the type of contract used and the attendant and dominant contractual features. 
 
3.2 Case analysis framework 
The case analysis borrows from Porter (1980), Ansoff (1984), Andreasen and Kotler (2003) and Armstrong 
(2006). According to Porter (1980) a competitive firm may pursue low-cost, differentiation or segmentation 
strategy. Ansoff (1984) identifies market penetration, product development, market development and 
diversification as typical growth strategies for firms. Additionally, Andreasen and Kotler (2003) argue that firms 
design missions, goals and competitive strategies based on their target markets, competitive position, growth and 
marketing mix elements. Further, Armstrong (2006) contends that a strength, weakness, opportunity and threats 
(SWOT) analysis provides a framework for identifying competitive and growth opportunities. These concepts 
might be more profound in B2B relationships between exporters and smallholders for two reasons.  One, the EU 
markets, Jaffee (2003) posits require exporters to have closer links with importers, supermarkets or wholesalers, 
investments in food and information technology and reliable suppliers from the farm level. Two, Burton et al., 
(2001) contend that consumer tastes and preferences drive EU markets dynamism with quality and safety 
attributes dominating demand. Consequently therefore, the export market, competitiveness (ability to invest and 
use technology) and source of supplies could potentially dictate an exporter’s mission and goals. This suggests 
that given the same environment large exporters with high capital base might have a different mission and goals 
compared to small exporters with low capital base and hence follow different strategies. Likewise, an exporter 
serving high care market chains (e.g. supermarkets) would follow a different distribution strategy compared with 
exporters targeting low value markets (e.g. wholesale). Additionally, an exporter of high care products might 
pursue an aggressive product differentiation due to high demand and profitability compared to an exporter of low 
value products where differentiation may be less profitable. 
 
Following Ansoff (1984) and Andreasen and Kotler (2003) frameworks, it is argued that the purpose, target 
market, competitive, growth, promotion, distribution and pricing strategies pursued by an exporter replicate at 
the smallholders’ farm level when choosing why and how to coordinate and govern B2B relationships. This 
means that an exporter’s size and the targeted EU outlet (i.e. supermarket or wholesale) determines the mode of 
supply governance adopted at the farm level and subsequently, the competitive, growth, promotion, distribution, 
and pricing strategies used. Therefore, given buyer power, an exporter chooses producers to contract 
(independent/organized/both), the contractual type (verbal/written/both) and determines specific features to 
guide strategies (e.g. the price and timing, payment mode and timing, product quality and safety measures, 
produce assembly and grading, packaging and produce identification etc). For example, as in Porter (1980) 
exporters competing as low-cost marketers could use verbal contracts and spot cash pricing to procure from 
independent producers to reduce excessive hold-up hazards. On the other hand, exporters competing through 
differentiation might use written contracts and forward pricing to procure from organized producers despite the 
high opportunity costs. Consequently, each exporter pursues a unique portfolio of strategies. 
 
However, the uniqueness of the portfolio of strategies may be influenced by what Eaton and Shepherd, (2001) 
refer to as farmers’ and exporters’ critical considerations that could be used to forge strategic or tactical pillars 
for an export company when contracting. Further, predicated on the critical considerations in Eaton and 
Shepherd (2001), strength, weakness, opportunity and threats (SWOT) analysis (Armstrong, 2006) is used to 
reveal strategic expectations. We first consider farming experience, farm size, fertility of farms and community 
considerations (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Farming experience connotes production expertise and reduced 
monitoring costs meaning that exporters would more likely absorb high opportunity cost in written contracts by 
engaging experienced farmers. The farm size reflects high outputs, potential for increased production capacity 
and economies of scale when implementing costly quality and safety standards like KenyaGAP/GlobalGAP. 
Therefore, exporters would risk hold-up problems in written contracts by transacting with large farmers. Fertile 
farms could potentially reduce use of high levels of fertilizers and pesticides and hence cost of production. In 
addition, as community considerations organized producers enhance collective regulation, critical supply 
markets and management of pooled land resources into one single unit. Consolidation reduces monitoring costs, 
and eases administration of production credit, inputs and crop assembly. Jointly, fertile farms and community 
organizations might endear use of a written contract as cost reduction and efficient management centres 
respectively. 
 
Further, consider an exporter’s resources, relationship intensity, supply reliability demands, quality and payment 
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incentives, level of control required and capital specificity (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001). Exporters with a stable 
capital base might adopt the more risky written contracts by designing incentive-specific features. A highly 
intensive relationship with smallholders signifies mutual sharing of hold-up problems in written contracts. 
Additionally, where demand for supply reliability is high, a mechanism that locks partners into an annual or 
multi-seasonal relationship could more likely exist under a written contract. Further, given quality incentives (e.g. 
use and control of farm inputs), monitoring detailed requirements might be more manageable under a written 
contract. Finally, payment incentives and the level of relation-specific capital indicate need for a governance 
mechanism that minimizes shared risks. For instance, co-ownership of produce sorting and packing sheds guards 
investments against being rendered un-operational by locking competitors out. On payment incentives, clearly 
specified terms under a written contract could opt smallholders as residual claimants of the exported produce 
price. 
 
4. Study area, data sources and description  
The primary data come from a 2006 survey of 249 French beans smallholders of Mwea Tebere. Farmers were 
randomly selected from a collection of 36 villages based on a beans crop on the farm. Using a short structured 
questionnaire farmers were interviewed on type of contracts used and marketing practices. French beans are 
produced mainly for export which attracts export market actors and a sizeable participation by local 
supermarkets (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). Producer groups are common in the study area especially due 
to mandatory quality management systems required for KenyaGAP/GlobalGAP certification (Graffham et al., 
2007; Kariuki et al., 2012). Most EU retailers ascribe to GlobalGAP. Independent producers exist due to demand 
for off-peak supplies or as suppliers to less strict quality standard markets (Ouma, 2010). There are supportive 
horticultural infrastructure for all year-round production and marketing such as Embu-Nairobi highway leading 
to JKIA, irrigation waters from rivers Nyamindi and Thiba and National Irrigation Board’s water canals, 
horticultural handling facilities and informal market reciprocity contracts (Obare and Kariuki, 2003). Secondary 
data has been obtained from internet resources of HCDA, KFC, FPEAK, Liaison Committee on Europe Africa 
Caribbean and Pacific countries (COLEACP), GlobalGAP and export firms.  
 
The abridged CoC in table 1 has been used to match the survey findings. When disaggregated by exporters, farm 
organization and exporter affiliations in table 2, essential characteristics of the whole sample can be observed.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of producers by farm organization, chain governance and affiliation  
 Farm organization Chain governance Chain affiliation 
Buyer Independent 
producers 
Group 
producers 
Verbal 
agreement 
Written 
agreement 
FPEAK COLEACP 
1 4 0 4 0 Y Y 
2 1 0 0 1 Y Y 
3 9 0 9 0 N  N 
4 4 0 4 0 Y N 
5 6 0 6 0 Y Y 
6 79 0 78 1 Y N 
7 14 29 39 4 Y Y 
8 7 1 7 1 Y Y 
9 1 60 1 60 Y N 
10 24 10 22 12 Y Y 
Total 149 100 170 79   
NB: N==No, Y==Yes 
Source: Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 2006 
 
The data has 10 exporters procuring smallholders’ supplies, 100 smallholders are in organized producer groups 
and 149 are independent producers. One hundred and seventy farmers use verbal contracts and 79, written 
contracts. The data has one exporter using written contracts, four using verbal contracts and five using both 
contracts to transact with farmers. On source of supplies, 6 exporters use independent producers and 4 exporters 
use both independent and organized producers. Of the ten exporters 9 are FPEAK members, 6 are COLEACP 
members and one has neither membership. There is indication that verbal contracts dominate exporter-
smallholders business relations in horticultural trade and use of written contracts is limited. The reasonable use 
of both contracts could be explained by duality of strict and less strict quality outlets in Western European 
markets. The data also suggests that procuring from independent producers is the key entry point in beans 
marketing. However, with demand for farm reorganizations to mitigate product quality, hygiene and safety 
concerns in Western European markets, supplies from organized producers are increasingly gaining importance 
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(Waweru, 2006). Membership to umbrella and supportive organizations seems critical in export marketing 
perhaps for bargaining and advocacy reasons.   
 
5. Results and discussions  
The results of the case analysis are presented in table 3. The first column of the table shows the derived purpose, 
target market, competitive, growth, promotion, distribution and pricing strategies conditional on written and 
verbal contracts. The rows define the dominant feature differentiating written and verbal contracts and 
identifying the strategies in the case analysis. The results are presented based on the dominant feature within the 
contracts. 
 
Table 3: Case analysis results 
Strategic strata Written contract Verbal contract 
Purpose of 
contract  
Govern supplies, improve quality and safety 
of export beans. 
Govern supplies, improve quality and safety 
of export beans. 
Target Organized producers (89.87), Independent 
producers (10.13) 
Independent producers (82.94), Organized 
producers (17.06) 
Competitive 
strategy 
Differentiation and segmentation: sourcing 
from organized and independent producers 
using written and verbal contracts 
Differentiation, segmentation and low-cost: 
sourcing from independent producers only 
using verbal and written contracts. 
Growth strategy Market penetration: full training on GAPP: 
use and application of pesticides, hygiene, 
post harvest care and book keeping 
Diversification: considerable training on 
GAPP: use and application of pesticides 
(80), hygiene (81.76), post harvest care 
(28.24) and book keeping (41.76) 
Distribution 
strategy 
Crate, grading by harvesters, grading on 
designated site, crop collected off-farm 
(96.2), collection by buyer’s agent, crop 
title change next market day (73.42), crop 
rejected next market day (86.08), crop 
rejection reason given (92.41), no 
compensation 
Crate, grading by harvesters (78.82), 
grading on designated site (93.53), crop 
collected off-farm (56.47), collection by 
buyer’s agent (95.29),  crop title change on 
market day (54.71),  crop rejected next 
market day (61.18), crop rejection reason 
given (86.47), no compensation 
Promotion 
strategy 
Farm code (39.24), group name (89.87), 
grade, date (79.75), farmer name, extension, 
direct linkage (81.01), consistent 
engagement 
Farm code (35.29), no group name (82.94), 
grade, date (61.18), farmer name (76.47), no 
extension (64.12), intermediary linkage 
(61.18), consistent engagement (55.88) 
Pricing strategy Sales receipt, variable price, payment by 
buyer’s agent, lagged payments, price 
buyer-given, price communicated to 
individual farmer, price communicated by 
buyer’s agent (60.76), Pricing timing at 
planting (82.28), Payment violations (68.35) 
No sales receipt (67.06), variable price 
(87.06), payment by buyer’s agent, lagged 
(52.35), price buyer-given, price 
communicated to individual farmer, price 
communicated by buyer’s agent (80), 
pricing timing at harvesting (86.47), 
Payment violations (85.29) 
NB: The figures in () are % of producers accessing that CoC requirement. Lack of % means that all the 
producers have access to that requirement   
Source: Mwea Tebere French beans survey, April-June 2006 
 
5.1 Purpose 
The contracts aim to facilitate the flow of quality, hygienic and safe supplies of French beans from smallholders 
to the export markets. Additionally, the contracts aim to strengthen trade exchanges between exporters and 
smallholders in export marketing. 
 
5.2 Target 
Buyers either emphasize on procuring from organized smallholders or independent producers. About ninety 
percent of smallholders in organized groups use written contracts. Written contracts are targeted at organized 
producers. These contracts seek to tap the economies of scale in administration and enforcement costs that are 
possible through organized production. For instance, per unit administrative and managerial costs of 
implementing ICPM, and traceability could be low in organized groups than for individual producers. This is 
likely because organized producers may effectively enforce an exporter’s regulations through group norms and 
values thus reducing costs of monitoring production and quality violations. This suggests that written contracts 
differentiate organized from independent producers in a homogeneous market. Written contracts might also 
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mean need for high quality, safe, reliable and consistent supplies throughout the year. 
 
Buyers using verbal contracts procure from approximately 83% of independent smallholders in the sample. 
Verbal contracts target independent producers as key suppliers. An important characteristic of independent 
producers is that they are numerous and widely dispersed in the growing region. Therefore, verbal contracts 
seem to capitalize on the homogeneity of French beans and grade and hence the contractual enforcement 
problems in such a market. Further, verbal contracts net a wider supplies base and benefits of the dynamics of 
market supply and demand. It may be inferred that verbal contracts mainly target producers who are not in 
organized groups either due to choice, government bureaucracy or lack of critical mass. Another possibility is 
that verbally engaged producers are suppliers of export markets that are not strict on productivist methods (e.g. 
traceability), or markets that serve short term on-season orders.   
 
5.3 Competitive strategies 
Buyers pursue cost leadership and segmentation, and differentiation and segmentation to compete in the market. 
Exporters 7, 8, 9 and 10 compete through cost leadership and segmentation by procuring beans from organized 
and independent producers using written and verbal contracts respectively or both (see table 2). Using written 
contracts with organized producers provides high volume of controlled, consistent and reliable supplies at 
reduced per unit costs. Additionally, they are more likely to farm quality, hygienic and safe produce and observe 
uniform grading, handling and traceability demanded in the respective EU consumer markets. In donor 
supported development programs, organized groups are key compliance organizations for international standards 
(e.g. GlobalGAP, ETI etc) for smallholders (Natural Resources Institute, 2003; Narrod et al. 2009). Conversely, 
procuring from independent producers using verbal contracts allows buyers to benefit from the forces of market 
supply and demand that might generate quasi-rents. For instance, they could be used to fill-in orders when 
supply from organized producers is insufficient to meet demand. This competitive strategy may be construed to 
balance the procurement base for targeted consumer markets to diversify market risks. This could be achieved as 
shown in Jaffee (2003) and Ouma (2010) by segregating produce to supply a given market segment e.g. produce 
from organized producers could be sold to high quality discerning markets and that from independent producers 
diverted to less quality discerning markets. Exporters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 pursue differentiation and segmentation. 
In effect, they specialize by procuring supplies from independent producers using verbal and written contracts. 
This strategy endows exporters with guided marketing focus whether serving high care category supermarket 
consumers or less strict wholesale markets. This could potentially consolidate and sustain uniform suppliers.  
 
5.4 Growth strategies 
The findings show that growth is either through market penetration or diversification. Procurement from 
smallholders using written contracts depict a market penetration strategy where exporters specialize on 
smallholders with full training on the generally accepted production practices (GAPP). The main purpose is to 
sustain and expand access into high end Western European consumer markets. GAPPs (i.e. crop and personal 
hygiene, post-harvest crop care and record keeping) qualify compliance with product quality and safety 
standards through control and minimization of health risks associated with pesticides residues and 
microbiological contaminations of marketed produce. It may be imputed that producers trained on GAPP gain 
competences on welfare issues, environmental conservation, product hygiene and safety which are marketing 
qualities in Western European markets.  
 
On the contrary, 80% and approximately 82% of smallholders using verbal contracts have training on use of 
pesticides and hygiene respectively but fewer have training on post-harvest crop care and record keeping. This 
shows considerable demand for crop and personal hygiene practices by exporters that might be serving markets 
that are strict and less strict on GAPP regulations such as Western European retailers and local supermarkets 
respectively. Therefore, growth seems to be through diversification. Despite low investments on GAPP, there is 
indication that independent smallholders could still access the EU market through exporters targeting dual 
markets. Arguably, verbal contracts are the most likely export market entry point for new entrants, part time or 
marginalized smallholders with small farm sizes and low investment capabilities. However, despite independent 
smallholders’ potential for continued participation in export markets, the increased harmonization of standards 
by EU buyers might render their market access unsustainable.  
 
5.5 Promotion strategies 
The results from the case analysis show buyers use varied promotion strategies notably linkage to market, 
provision of extension services and frequency of trade during the season. Eighty one per cent of smallholders 
using written contracts are directly linked to markets by buyer as outlined in the CoC. Conversely, 61.2% of 
smallholders in verbal contracts are linked to markets through intermediaries. On one hand, direct linkage offers 
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an exporter the opportunity to closely interact with suppliers which builds trust and mutual dependence as in 
personal selling. On the other hand, linkage through intermediaries typifies the problem of organizing numerous 
small farmers into an orderly marketing system where product, input and credit market failures persist. This 
could be viewed as a weak case of franchising. In weak market structures, the role of intermediaries is critical 
especially if they have competitive advantage in assembling produce and transportation (Gabre-Madhin, 2001). 
 
Another promotional tool is provision of extension services. All smallholders using written contracts receive 
extension visits during the production season but 64% of smallholders using verbal contracts do not receive 
extension. This suggests that in written contracts exporters endear themselves to smallholders by providing 
technical, material or informational assistance and monitoring crop production akin to customer relations 
services. Low extension services in verbal contracts are not unlikely since servicing numerous independent 
producers generates enormous training, administrative and monitoring costs. 
 
The frequency of trading with smallholders during the season is another promotion strategy. In written contracts, 
all smallholders have consistent trade exchanges meaning that exporters and producers have a full time repeated 
and all season contact. This might be predicated on exporters’ need for consistency and reliability of supplies 
while asserting credibility and reputation. Fifty six per cent of smallholders using verbal contracts have 
consistent trade exchanges. The fact that verbal contracts operate much in the open market system where trade 
exchanges are weak could explain why some smallholders have intermittent contact. The result is that 
buyers/suppliers are predisposed to hazards of shifting suppliers/buyers depending on demand and supply in a 
given region. 
 
5.6 Distribution strategies 
Exporters have varied distributional tactics: crop assembly, grading, crop title, quality check and traceability. 
More than 96% of smallholders using written contracts use a designated grading shed to assemble beans 
compared to 56.5% of those using verbal contracts. As a distribution tactic this resembles a mono-distribution 
channel in written contracts and a multiple distribution channel in verbal contracts given that about 43.5% of 
smallholders use farm level grading sheds. Centralized crop assembly reduces per unit transportation costs and 
standardizes grades while decentralizing assembly diversifies quality risks. Further, buyers’ agents handle 
produce from all smallholders in written contracts while buyers’ agents handle produce from 96% of those in 
verbal contracts. This finding shows that crop assembly is mainly the responsibility of intermediaries.   
 
On grading, all produce from smallholders using written contracts is graded by harvesters at a designated grading 
shed. In verbal contracts, approximately 79% and 94% of smallholders use the services of harvesters and grade 
at a designated shed respectively. Use of harvesters and a designated shed are strategic options. In written 
contracts where differentiation seems to be the key competitive strategy, strict use of harvesters to grade at a 
designated shed ensures uniformity of grades and minimizes quality and safety failures because of supervised 
post-farm produce hygiene. If low cost strategy is pursued minimal use of on-farm sheds and considerable use of 
company employees during grading are dominant. 
 
Another distribution tactic is the timing of the change of crop title. Crop title for more than 72% of smallholders 
using written contracts changes the following market day. Conversely, crop title changes on the market day for 
more than 54% of smallholders using verbal contracts. There is indication of pronounced tactical delay of 
product acceptance in written contracts possibly to hedge on quality and safety measures in the marketing 
channel. In verbal contracts there is a near balance of immediate ownership and tactical delay perhaps as a 
mechanism to spread marketing risks.  
 
On quality checks, over 86% of smallholders using written contracts have crop rejects reported the following 
market day and more than 92% received reasons for crop rejection. Approximately 61% of smallholders in 
verbal contracts have crop rejects reported the following market day and slightly more than 86% know reasons 
for crop rejection. The findings suggest more secondary grading of beans to achieve desired quality for export 
markets for those in written than verbal contracts. However, opportunistic disposal of unsold beans from 
previous deliveries cannot be overruled for transparency behind rejection returns lacks since farmers are not 
represented during secondary sorting in Nairobi. The findings also show that information for rejections is widely 
available suggesting that disclosure of reasons for crop rejection might be intended to minimize channel conflict. 
Arguably, buyers do not insure producers against distribution inefficiencies on their part.  
 
Produce traceback system is another distribution strategy which includes packaging and identification of grades, 
producer/group and farm. In both contracts, plastic crates are the standard package for transporting beans from 
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the farm to Nairobi for processing, cutting, freezing, pre-packaging or canning ready for export. A crate’s 
distributional advantages include ample space to pack beans, possibility of stacking during transportation and 
transparency of the grade, color and freshness of beans. Crates also reduce chances of unfair marketing practices 
such as over-packing of beans at the farm level aimed at getting extra beans during repackaging in Nairobi. On 
identification, all smallholders using written contracts strictly use own name and grade but only grades are 
identifiable among all smallholders using verbal contracts. Not surprising, about 90% of smallholders in written 
contracts use producer group’s name and 80% also use the produce collection date compared to 77% using own 
name and 61% using produce collection date for those in verbal contracts. Farm identification in both contracts 
is low. If interpreted as branding, smallholders using written contracts are more differentiated and traceable. In 
both contracts, there is indication that exporters implement a least cost traceability system.  
 
5.7 Pricing strategies 
The pricing strategy consists of price formation, communication and timing, payment mode, receipting and 
compensation. Irrespective of contractual arrangement, prices are buyer given, buyers’ agents pay for deliveries 
and prices are communicated to individual farmers. This has several implications. As price takers smallholders 
wield no bargaining power. Communicating price to individual farmers widens price differentials among farmers 
either in a given producer group, among those selling to the same buyer or those supplying the same grade. On 
use of agents to pay farmers exposure to unfair pricing practices such as falsified low prices increases. 
Collectively, this pricing approach might be intentionally strategic to reduce transaction costs and generate 
quasi-rents.  
 
Uniquely, prices given to all smallholders using written contracts vary during the season, payments are lagged 
and crop deliveries are receipted. This suggests that prices are based on market demand and supply, buyers 
spread price risks through residual claimancy and receipting solidifies future exchanges (see Hueth, 1999 for 
examples). Though not conclusive, written contracts seem to be hinged on differentiation. Conversely, price 
offers in verbal contracts vary for 87%, payments are lagged for 52.4% and sales receipts are not issued for 
67.1% of smallholders respectively. This depicts pricing diversity perhaps to reduce procurement costs by 
exploiting market supply and demand dynamics and less paper work. The overall finding seems to suggest 
dominance of low cost strategy in verbal contracts. 
 
On timing of price announcement, 82% of smallholders in written contracts know expected prices during 
planting while more than 87% in verbal contracts know prices during harvesting. Further, agents communicate 
prices for more than 60% of smallholders in written contracts compared to 80% in verbal contracts. Buyers using 
written contracts seem to specialize in forward pricing perhaps to spur production but use spot cash pricing in 
verbal contracts possibly to exploit market supply and demand. Agency is more pronounced in verbal contracts.  
 
Violation of payments and lack of a compensation scheme are the other pricing strategies. More than 68% of 
smallholders in written contracts and slightly above 85% in verbal contracts report violation of payments and 
there is no compensation scheme for all smallholders in both contracts if buyers fail to honour price 
arrangements. The possible explanation to widespread payment violation might be the strict communication of 
prices to individual farmers and substantial control of payments by exporters’ agents which hinder cooperative 
bargaining on payment complaints. These constraints expose smallholders to exploitation. Another reason could 
be that exporters renege on agreed payments to adjust their prices to reflect prevailing market conditions such as 
fluctuated export prices, demand and competition at the farm level. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
This paper uses strategic management approach to examine how B2B relationships between exporters and 
smallholders shape the purpose, target market, distribution, promotion, pricing, competitive and growth 
strategies when procuring smallholders’ horticultural supplies. A case analysis based on written and verbal 
contracts is presented using data from a survey of 249 French beans producers. 
 
The case analysis indicates that the use of written or verbal contracts is mainly to procure high quality and safe 
produce from smallholders. Written contracts target organized producers and verbal contracts, independent 
producers. Differentiation, segmentation and low-cost strategies are the main competitive edges used by 
exporters in which written and verbal contracts are independently or jointly used to capture organized and 
independent producers. Exporters using written contracts are market penetrators emphasizing growth into 
Western European markets through complete training on GAPP. Those using verbal contracts are diversification 
strategists requiring reasonable but not strict training on GAPP. In both contracts, plastic crates packaging is the 
only common distribution strategy. Surprisingly, both contracts uniquely lack a compensation scheme. On 
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promotion strategy farm produce for those in written contracts is completely identifiable by grade and producer’s 
name, farmers access extension services and business exchanges are consistent. The grade is the only complete 
identification feature in verbal contracts.  The pricing strategy in both contracts is common in that price is buyer-
given, communicated to individual farmers and payments are made by buyers’ agents. While prices vary, 
payments are lagged and supplies are receipted in written contracts, a portfolio of prices, payments and 
receipting regimes is maintained in verbal contracts. 
 
The case findings imply that with the increased awareness of food quality and safety by EU consumers and 
regulations on traceability of farm produce use of written or verbal contracts in B2B relations with smallholders 
is justifiable. This will co-opt smallholders as individual producers or collective marketing institutions (e.g. 
farmer groups/ associations/ cooperatives etc) to mitigate product quality and distribution failure. Further, given 
the duality of export markets in terms of strict and less strict demand for GAPP, market opportunities for produce 
from smallholders exist. Additionally, to sustain market access, quality and safety requirements and profitability 
more emphasis on distribution, promotion and pricing strategies is needed.  
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